Thinking through the meteoric rise of Middle-East carriers from Singapore Airlines' vantage point by FAN, Terence P. C. & LINGBLAD, Mats
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business
7-2016
Thinking through the meteoric rise of Middle-East
carriers from Singapore Airlines' vantage point
Terence P. C. FAN
Singapore Management University, terencefan@smu.edu.sg
Mats LINGBLAD
ESSEC Business School
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2016.04.003
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Strategic Management Policy Commons, and the
Transportation Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator
of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
FAN, Terence P. C. and LINGBLAD, Mats. Thinking through the meteoric rise of Middle-East carriers from Singapore Airlines'
vantage point. (2016). Journal of Air Transport Management. 54, 111-122. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5128
Thinking through the meteoric rise of Middle-East carriers from
Singapore Airlines' vantage point
Terence Ping Ching Fan a, *, Mats Lingblad b
a Singapore Management University, 50 Stamford Road, 5F, 178899, Singapore
b ESSEC, Singapore
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 4 November 2015
Received in revised form
12 April 2016
Accepted 12 April 2016
Available online 28 April 2016
Key words:
Middle East
Full-service incumbents
Intercontinental hubs
Singapore Airlines
Emirates
Etihad
Qatar Airways
a b s t r a c t
The rise of Middle East carriers in the past decade has been nothing less than meteoric. Based on the
notion of generic strategy, we analysed the potential for competitors of the leading Middle East carriers
to respond in terms of market scope and product characteristics, using Singapore Airlines as a reference.
We found that it was generally difﬁcult for Singapore Airlines to compete in terms of market scope, and
thus it should concentrate on offering different degrees of differentiation in its products. While the latest
small, long-haul aircraft could help increase Singapore Airlines' market scope, this impact would be
marginal at best. We compared the product offerings and prices for the Business and Economy cabins,
and noted the intensive competitive pressures the leading Middle East carriers exerted on Singapore
Airlines. Improving speciﬁc product qualities such as guaranteeing a horizontally ﬂat bed in Business and
the overall quality in Economy helps competitors command higher prices, while other niches are still
possible.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The rise of several Middle East carriers, namely Emirates Airline,
Qatar Airways and Etihad Airways, or ‘ME3’, in providing full-
service scheduled international air transport has been nothing
less than meteoric. While there are subtle differences in strategy
among the three, all expanded their capacity to cater to primarily
passengers originating from and destined to places outside of their
home bases (Carey, 2015). These three carriers ﬂew a combined
total of fewer than 20 million passengers in 2004. Only eight years
later e deﬁnitely less than a decade, these three carried more than
75 million passengers in 2012 (Dresner et al., 2015). The aggregate
passenger growth rate for these three carriers combined over these
years was an impressive 24% per year. ME3's route network at the
end of 2015 covered most primary and secondary cities in Europe,
much of Africa, Asia, North America, an increasing number of cities
in Latin America, as well as extensive trans-Tasman coverage (be-
tween Australia and New Zealand). In 2014, the number of pas-
sengers (70 million) ﬂying out of Dubai, home of Emirates,
surpassed that of London Heathrow (Critchlow, 2015).
Meanwhile, many competitors claimed that the rise of ME3 led
to signiﬁcant losses in trafﬁc. Reports suggested that when Dubai
overtook Singapore as the airport where most passengers on the
London-Sydney route stopped en route, the rise in passenger
numbers in Dubai coincided with a comparable drop for Singapore
(Raghuvanshi, 2013). Thai Airways suffered losses since 2013 and
Malaysia Airlines since 2010, with both seeing tremendous growth
in capacity by ME3 to their home countries but little in their ﬂag
carriers (Jittapong, 2014; Kedmey, 2014; Nguyen, 2015). For trav-
ellers based in the home countries of these three South-east Asian
carriers, ME3 offer ﬂights both westward to Europe and Africa and
eastward to Australasia e a compelling alternative to their
respective ﬂag-carriers. In Europe, Lufthansa claimed that its
Frankfurt hub lost almost a third of its market share on routes
between Europe and Asia in a decade since 2005 (Carey, 2015).
Even U.S. carriers claimed that the growth of ME3 had begun to
threaten the viability of the entire U.S. airline industry (Critchlow,
2015).
How can ME3's competitors respond? Porter (1980) proposed
the notion of generic strategy as a way for companies to think
through how they can position themselves relative to competitors.
Once a company decides to be in an industry, ‘the second really
fundamental question on strategy is positioning within the* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: terencefan@smu.edu.sg (T.P.C. Fan).
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industry…because you can't be a superior performer in any in-
dustry without some kind of competitive advantage’ (Porter, 1987:
p.3). In other words, generic strategy lets competitors adopt
different positions relative to one another, softening the need for
direct, cut-throat competition e a prospect any for-proﬁt entity
would be loath to face. We examine in this paper how competitors
like Singapore Airlines can apply the notion of generic strategy to
differentiate themselves from the fast-growing airlines of the
Middle East.
Generic strategy describes an array of positions ﬁrms can adopt
in relation to two orthogonal dimensions: market scope (on the
vertical axis) and product characteristic (on horizontal axis).
Vertically, a broad market scope (higher on the axis for market
scope) means that a company's products are offered to a wide
swathe of customers. A narrow market scope (lower on the vertical
axis) means that a company's products are offered only in certain
market niches. Horizontally, a low-cost strategy for a product (to-
ward the left on the axis for product characteristics) is one that
translates certain advantages to low prices, and often with few or
no frills for the customers. Alternately, a differentiated position for
a product (toward the right on the horizontal axis), is one that is
often associated with superior reputation, premium services and,
often, higher prices.
Based on the notion of generic strategy, we examine the relative
positions between ME3 and Singapore Airlines as a representative
competitor. We ﬁrst analyse the market scope that ME3 could
potentially attain, and then their product characteristics relative to
Singapore Airlines. In this paper, we focus on routes linking Europe
to South-east Asia and Australasia, where ME3 and Singapore Air-
lines present the most direct competition.
2. Market scope
2.1. Potential reach
The airline industry exhibits strong economies of scale in terms
of trafﬁc density (Gillen et al., 1990). Coordinating schedules such
that ﬂights frommany cities arrive and depart at similar times at an
airline's hub facilitates ﬂight connections on many more city pairs
than just the number of routes that the airline ﬂies. This helps the
airline better aggregate trafﬁc to/from its cities served, in turn
allowing higher frequencies to be deployed to these cities (Hansen,
1990; Adler, 2001; Gillen and Morrison, 2005). In the U.S. domestic
airline network, such hub-and-spoke network designs have been
shown to attract signiﬁcant passenger trafﬁc compared with iso-
lated non-stop, hub-bypassing service (Hansen, 1990; Zhang,1996).
In a similar manner, the home-bases of ME3 and Singapore Airlines
act as hubs for trafﬁc between Europe and South-east Asia, and
between Europe and Australasia (Oum et al., 1993). Thai Airways
and Malaysia Airlines, with their home bases close to Singapore,
and to a smaller extent Cathay Paciﬁc Airways out of Hong Kong,
also cater to this trafﬁc.
The number of destinations and therefore city-pairs to which
scheduled ﬂights are offered is arguably the most representative
measure of market scope for an airline. For an airline focusing on
using its home base as a hub to facilitate ﬂight connections to/from
many other cities, cities around its hub naturally become part of its
sphere of inﬂuence because passengers to/from these cities often
do not have to detour signiﬁcantly when making ﬂight connections
at that airport (Gimeno, 1999). Table 1 shows the ﬂight distances
between representative points in Europe and South-east Asia, and
between Europe and Australia. These distances are similar whether
or not the routing is non-stop or through Dubai, Singapore or Hong
Kong. In other words, the detour necessitated by a ﬂight connection
in one of these three cities is small.
Because of geographical proximity, the focal airline can easily
afford to operate higher frequencies to cities nearby, which in turn
increase the attractiveness of its connecting services elsewhere.
Meanwhile, cities within one airline's sphere of inﬂuence can
provide important connecting trafﬁc to that airline's hub, and in
turn, that airline can seek to exert more presence and even higher
pricing power for trafﬁc to/from these cities (Borenstein, 1989;
Brueckner and Zhang, 2001). In turn, serving many destinations
within a region with frequent ﬂights facilitates the focal airline to
be marketed as a preferred carrier among corporate and individual
customers from that region. In general, the larger the demand
originating from an airline's sphere of inﬂuence, the easier it is to
proﬁtably increase its number of destinations.
With respect to trafﬁc between Europe and South-east Asia, and
between Europe and Australasia, the entire Europe, the Near East
and the Middle East can be considered within ME3's sphere of in-
ﬂuence. ME3 can serve most cities in Europe with a single aircraft
on a daily rotation (e.g., ﬂights between, say, Dubai and Paris would
be about 7 h each way). This enables ME3 to aggregate trafﬁc to/
from a large number of cities in Europe. Likewise, airlines based in
South-east Asia such as Singapore Airlines enjoy easier access
within South-east Asia, and to Australasia (e.g., ﬂights between, say,
Singapore and Melbourne, Australia, averaged less than 8 h each
way). This enables Singapore Airlines to aggregate trafﬁc to/from
cities in South-east Asia and Australasia, and consider cities in these
regions as within its own sphere of inﬂuence.
The demand for air transport has long been shown to increase
with the economic output of travellers' trip origin. In terms of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), the European Union alone reported a total
of USD 18.5 trillion in 2014, other non-E.U. European countries like
Norway and Switzerland reported another USD 1.2 trillion while
near-East and Middle-east countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates contributed another USD 3.4 trillion
(Wikipedia, 2016a). In comparison, Australia, New Zealand, coun-
tries in South-east Asia, plus Hong Kong and Bangladesh, added up
to USD 5.2 trillion in GDP in 2014. In other words, the GDP forME3's
sphere of inﬂuence is more than four times that of the GDP for
Singapore Airlines' sphere of inﬂuence: ME3 has a much larger
economic ‘hinterland’ as a proxymeasure of potential market scope
than Singapore Airlines.
More speciﬁcally, studies have portrayed the demand for pas-
senger air travel as a function of GDP per capita, and this relation
occurs in logarithmic terms: halving a country's GDP per capita
decimates its air travel demand per capita. Boeing (2015: 22) shows
that on average, countries with USD $10,000 in Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) per capita take about one trip per person per year by
air. The European Union alone reported a population of about 500
million. Summing up the population in countries in Europe, the
Near-East and the Middle East with a GDP per capita over USD
$10,000 yields a total of 639 million. In comparison, Australia, New
Zealand, and countries in South-east Asia with a GDP per capita
over USD $10,000 yields a total population of only 71 million
(Wikipedia, 2016b, 2016c). Even when Thailand and Indonesia
(with GDP per capita between USD $3000 and $6000) are included,
the total population for countries in Singapore Airlines' sphere of
inﬂuence is only 387 million, about half of that of ME3. The much
larger population and air travel demand originating from within
ME3's sphere of inﬂuence, as summarized in Table 2, provides a
much stronger support for ME3 to proﬁtably offer a far higher level
of market scope than Singapore Airlines. In other words, Singapore
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Airlines e and its other competitors based in South-east Asia as
well e will unlikely beat ME3 in terms of what the trafﬁc feed the
latter can amass.1
2.2. Limits of bilaterals?
The previous section shows that the underlying economic
product and population counts within ME3's sphere of inﬂuence
overwhelm those within Singapore Airlines'. This allows ME3 to
potentially achieve a far broader market scope than Singapore
Airlines. In practice, however, bilateral air service agreements can
limit the achievable market scope.
Note that ﬂight connections offered by ME3 and Singapore
Airlines are international in nature. As long as an airline obtains
trafﬁc rights between its home country and two foreign countries
independently, it typically is allowed to arrange a connecting itin-
erary between the two foreign countries via its home country
through two separate ﬂight numbers. This has been the basis for
airlines with small home markets, such as Singapore Airlines and
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, to grow (Carey, 2015).
One important feature of bilateral air service agreements is that
air trafﬁc rights are typically granted till perpetuity. Moreover, the
overall trend has been for governments to progressively liberalize
such agreements instead of imposing more restrictions over time.
Limitations on aircraft performance until the late 1980s meant that
ﬂights between Europe and Asia required refuelling stops in the
Middle East, and airlines (mostly European and Asian at that time)
were keen to obtain trafﬁc rights beyond their Middle East stops.
For instance, Singapore Airlines operated multiple service to
Europe via Dubai in the 1980s with full rights in the Dubai-Europe
sectors. In return, similar air trafﬁc rights were often accorded to
countries in the Middle East e particularly the United Arab Emir-
ates (where Emirates and Etihad are based).
Throughout the 1990s, the U.S. actively pursued liberal, so-
called ‘Open-Skies’ bilateral agreements with other countries
(U.S., 2016), with the ultimate goal of increasing capacity and
reducing the cost for customers. The U.S. found allies in the Middle
East, particularly since carriers based there were at the time un-
likely to effectively utilize trafﬁc rights enshrined in these agree-
ments (Qatar Airways was getting a re-boot at the time, and Etihad
had not been formed yet). The Open Skies agreements between the
U.S. and the U.A.E., and between the U.S. and Qatar, were all
negotiated in this period. These agreements allow ME3 to make a
stop en-route from their home country to U.S., and allow them to
pick up trafﬁc between this stop and the U.S., provided of course
that the country of this en-route stop also allows this. From 2006 to
2008, Emirates operated a daily non-stop ﬂight between New York
and Hamburg, Germany, on its way to/from Dubai. Since 2015,
Emirates has been operating a daily non-stop between New York
and Milan, Italy, on its way to/from Dubai, although airlines typi-
cally have to offer lower prices for such ‘ﬁfth-freedom’ routes
(Drescher, 2015).
Many other countries followed the U.S. in signing more liberal
bilateral agreements to increase consumer welfare, for both resi-
dents of their countries and inbound visitors. The case of trans-
Tasman ﬂights illustrates how ME3 is keen to expand its reach to
cater to ﬁfth-freedom trafﬁc. In the mid-2000s, Emirates began
adding trans-Tasman sectors to its Australia services. It gradually
built up a daily wide-body service on each of these trans-Tasman
routes: Auckland-Brisbane, Auckland-Melbourne, Auckland-
Sydney and Sydney-Christchurch. For several years, the Auckland-
Melbourne service was served as a part of the circuitous
Auckland-Melbourne-Singapore-Dubai ﬂight instead of a continu-
ation of the Melbourne-Dubai non-stop, and Christchurch-Sydney
was served as a part of the circuitous Christchurch-Sydney-
Bangkok-Dubai ﬂight instead of the Sydney-Dubai non-stop. This
shows that ME3 has been keen to focus on ﬁfth-freedom trafﬁc.
In an evenmore striking example to show Emirates' focus on the
ﬁfth-freedom trafﬁc, the August 2004 (p. 797, 1218, 1222) issue of
the Ofﬁcial Airline Guide (OAG) shows that the daily ﬂight EK404,
originating from Dubai, departs from Singapore at 1520 and arrives
in Melbourne at 0030 the next day, but departs from Melbourne at
0830 in themorning for Auckland. TheMelbourne-Auckland sector,
instead of departing shortly after the aircraft arrived from
Singapore, stayed overnight in Melbourne before leaving at a more
civilized time better suited for the local trafﬁc. From Singapore to
Auckland, the OAG did not even list EK404 as an option even though
it was a same-plane service with the same ﬂight number. In other
words, the Melbourne-Auckland sector of EK404 was intended
solely for the local ﬁfth-freedom trafﬁc instead of through trafﬁc
from Singapore or Dubai. In comparison, from the 1980s to 2015,
Singapore Airlines did not serve any trans-Tasman routes.
Relative to Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways have been less
conspicuous in exploiting ﬁfth-freedom trafﬁc rights. For some
years, Etihad did serve Singapore-Brisbane as a continuation of its
ﬂight from Abu Dhabi. Neither Etihad nor Qatar Airways ﬂew any
trans-Tasman service. In late 2015, neither of these two airlines had
any ﬁfth-freedom ﬂights out of Singapore, while Emirates
continued to operate three daily ﬁfth-freedom ﬂights out of
Table 1
Flight distances (km) between select origins and destinations.
London-Sydney London-Perth Amsterdam-Jakarta Frankfurt-Kuala Lumpur
Nonstop 17,016 14,499 11,353 10,001
Via Dubai 17,589 14,577 11,718 10,398
Via Singapore 17,176 14,783 11,395 10,577
Via Hong Kong 17,019 15,654 12,533 11,704
Source: www.gcmap.com
Table 2
Summary statistics on the size of the airlines' sphere of inﬂuence.
Europe-S.E. Asia & Europe-Australasia corridors ME3 Singapore Airlines ME3 ÷ Singapore Airline
Sphere of inﬂuence Europe þ Near/Middle East Australasia þ South-east Asia
GDP (USD Trillion) 19.7 þ 3.4 ¼ 23.1 1.6 þ 3.6 ¼ 5.2 23.1 ÷ 5.2 ¼ 4.5
Population in millions (GDP per capita > USD $10,000/year) 503 þ 136 ¼ 639 28 þ 43 ¼ 71 639 ÷ 71 ¼ 9.0
1 It is also worth noting that South Asia and Africa also contribute to ME3's
sphere of inﬂuence from the perspective of travellers originating from or destined
to Europe e further adding to ME3's inherent strength.
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Singapore, one to Colombo, Sri Lanka, one to Brisbane, and one to
Melbourne, Australia.
To reciprocate the liberal air trafﬁc policies of other countries,
the U.A.E. adopts a liberal stance in granting foreign carrier trafﬁc
rights beyond the U.A.E. Federal Express of the U.S. has taken
advantage of these rights to set up a cargo hub in Dubai (Carey,
2015). For many years, Malaysia Airlines operated a thrice-weekly
non-stop service from Dubai to Newark, and Singapore Airlines
also operated several weekly non-stops from Dubai to Istanbul and
Cairo.
In one situation where Canada stood ﬁrm to limit trafﬁc rights
accorded to Emirates, the U.A.E. subsequently disallowed Canada to
use the U.A.E. as a staging area for the war in Afghanistan (Carey,
2015). Canada remained the only exception where the ME3 could
not negotiate a daily service in the bilateral air service agreement.
In many countries served by ME3, ME3 offered far more frequent
service and capacity than the airlines based in these countries. For
example, in late 2015, Emirates operated six ﬂights a day on the
Dubai-Bangkok route, while Thai Airways ﬂew just one. On the
Dubai-Kuala Lumpur route, Emirates operated four daily ﬂights
while Malaysia Airlines just one. On the Dubai e London, UK route,
British Airways operated three daily non-stops while Emirates
operated nine.
In summary, bilateral air service agreements have not thwarted
ME3 in their expansion to most countries. In fact, carriers such as
Singapore Airlines simply cannot hope to even match ME3's broad
market scope. While Qatar Airways and Etihad lagged behind
Emirates in network reach, Emirates' network showed the extent
their market scope could be. Table 3 shows all destinations served
by Singapore Airlines in late-2015, as well as some destinations
served by ME3, providing proof that Emirates' network has simply
eclipsed that of Singapore Airlines'.
3. Product characteristics
3.1. Premium cabins
Since its inception, Singapore Airlines has focused on surpassing
its competitors in its service. Reputedly, it has received the most
awards among the world's airlines (Lee, 2016). It has consistently
been a leader in its First and Business cabins. Singapore Airlines
became the ﬁrst carrier in 1998 to let travellers in its First and
Business cabins to book entrees such as the famed lobster ther-
midor to be served in-ﬂight in advance (Dykins, 2016). In Business
class, most long-haul routes now feature the industry's widest seats
that can turn into horizontally ﬂat beds, and with every seat having
direct aisle access (i.e., state-of-the-art four abreast seating).
Meanwhile, the ME3 have devoted signiﬁcant resources to make
Table 3
All of Singapore Airlines' passenger ﬂight destinations and some of ME3's.
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their premium cabins special. As a ﬁrst in the industry, Emirates
installed on-board showers on its A380 aircraft in its First cabin,
while Etihad installed a three-room suite (with en suite shower and
bathroom) on the A380 in its ‘Residence’ offering e above its First-
class equivalent, the ‘Apartment’. Both Emirates and Etihad offer
complimentary chauffeur-driven rides for customers in their First
or Business cabins to/from the airport. Further, customers in the
First or Business cabins of Etihad and Qatar Airways can choose to
dine at any time they wish. All three ME3 carriers have a social area
for their First and Business customers on board the A380 aircraft
with a bar and sofa. In reality, however, First class is offered only on
a small subset of routes, and by the number of seats the Business
cabin is by far much more available.
Table 4 compares several features of the First and Business
cabins onME3 versus on Singapore Airlines. It shows thatME3 offer
slightly more features than Singapore Airlines in First class, but if a
customer expects a seat in Business class that converts to a hori-
zontally ﬂat bed with direct aisle access, then Singapore Airlines
beats Emirates and Qatar Airways but is eclipsed by Etihad. One of
the most comprehensive ratings of airline quality and voted by
passengers, the Skytrax rating (1e5 stars, 5 being the best) provides
a more multi-faceted view of an airline's product, including service
quality.
To examine the extent to which cabin features are reﬂected in
the prices, we conducted a small fare survey on select routes in the
Europe-South-east Asia and Europe-Australasia corridors. We
sampled in mid-April 2015 all-inclusive return fares for one pas-
senger departing on Wednesdays and returning the next Tuesdays,
starting in two weeks in late April, as well as in the second week of
May, June, July, August, September and October. The fares were
taken from skyscanner.com e a meta-website linked to individual
airline sites, and for travel originating in both ends of the routes.
We surveyed a total of eleven markets: ﬁve featuring daily or
near-daily non-stops between Singapore and Europe (London UK,
Paris, Frankfurt, Milan, Zurich), four other featuring near-daily
service by European carriers but Singapore would be a logical
connecting point (Jakarta e Paris, Jakarta e Amsterdam, Denpasar
e Amsterdam, Kuala Lumpur e Frankfurt), plus two ultra-long
routes of Sydney (Australia) e London (UK), and Singapore e
New York (added because of ME3's increasing popularity). In
particular, we surveyed the lowest fare for a carrier offering a
connecting itinerary involving no more than one 4-h wait during
ﬂight connection (we excluded airlines that did not offer such a
convenient connection). Because First class was not consistently
offered in our sampled markets, we surveyed only the Business
airfares (as well as Economy ones) for consistency. In total, 251
carrier-route combinations and 1103 price observations were
included. Unfortunately we were not able to systematically access
corporate discounts for these airfares.
Fig. 1 shows the all-inclusive Business return fares for the
Sydney-London U.K. market, averaged over all observations from
Skyscanner.com. For trips originating in both Sydney and London,
Singapore Airlines indeed charged comparable prices as Emirates
and Etihad. This was consistent with Singapore Airlines' features in
Business class being on par with those of ME3. Qantas of Australia
consistently offered higher prices than others on this market,
possibly reﬂecting its long heritage and direct ﬂight (i.e., same ﬂight
number for the entire trip). British Airways only charged a small
premium relative to Singapore Airlines, and only for trips origi-
nating in its home base of London, U.K. China Southern Airlines was
a relative newcomer to this market, and this was reﬂected in its
much lower prices.
Fig. 2 shows the all-inclusive Business return fares for theMilan-
Singapore market, averaged over all weeks of observations as dis-
played on Skyscanner.com. In this market, Singapore Airlines was
the only operator providing non-stop service, and hence was ex-
pected to enjoy a signiﬁcant price premium even for trips origi-
nating in Milan e as was conﬁrmed.
Economists have long designedways to explain price differences
for products that are differentiated, through the so-called ‘hedonic
price models’ (e.g., Goodman, 1998; Griliches, 1971; Rosen, 1974).
We applied the principle of hedonic price modelling to explain via
regression analyses the price differences observed in our airfare
survey as a function of service attributes.
When all the sampled Business airfares were put in ordinary
least-squares regression with airfares by Cathay Paciﬁc Airways as
the reference, the estimated coefﬁcients are shown in Table 5.
Model 1 included speciﬁc trip characteristics and used airline-
speciﬁc dummy variables to represent other service attributes.
Here, trips originating in Asia-Paciﬁc recorded a price premium of
SGD $854. Being able to guarantee a horizontally ﬂat bed in Busi-
ness is associated with a price premium of SGD $735 e achieved by
both Singapore and Etihad Airways on their long-haul ﬂights, but
not for Emirates and Qatar Airways.
Interestingly, the Skytrax cabin rating (between 1 and 5 stars,
with 5 stars being the most desirable) for Business class did not
correlate with the observed airfares, likely because airfare pricing
in this cabin had other inﬂuences outside of speciﬁc cabin features.
Originating a trip in a carrier's home country also did not guarantee
a price premium, possibly as a result of the strong marketing
Table 4
Comparing features of Premium cabins.
Emirates Etihad Qatar Airways Singapore Airlines
First class (or above)
On board showers Yes Yes No No
Horizontally ﬂat beds Yes Yes Yes Yes
Guaranteed aisle access Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chauffeur drive Yes Yes No No
Dine on demand No Yes Yes No
Book entree in advance No No No Yes
Skytrax star rating 4.5 4 5 5
Business class (long haul)
Horizontally ﬂat beds Depends Yes Depends Mostly
Guaranteed aisle access No Yes No Mostly
Chauffeur drive Yes Yes No No
Dine on demand No Yes Yes No
Book entree in advance No No No Yes
Skytrax star rating 4 4 5 4.5
Depends e depends on aircraft types. Mostly e on most intercontinental services. Etihad and Qatar Airways' ratings were just prior to their selective withdrawal in 2014.
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presence of ME3 in many countries. Even accounting for the
different trip characteristics, Singapore Airlines was still able to
charge a premium relative to ME3. It was also possible that ME3 or
other carriers may have a deliberate motive to price their Business
products low to clear seat inventory (Hugon-Duprat and O'Connell,
2015). Unfortunately, we were not able to access data pertaining to
the number of tickets sold, nor reasons of travel (Mason, 2005;
Dresner, 2006).
Model 2 included only the airline, route and date dummy vari-
ables in the analysis. Here, Singapore Airlines was able to charge
higher airfares compared with ME3 (p < 0.001), indicating that it
adopted a more differentiated position compared with ME3.
3.2. Economy cabin
In comparison to First and Business, airlines generally have less
room to manoeuvre on what to offer in their Economy cabins. ME3
and Singapore Airlines offered similar features in their Economy
cabin such as an amenity kit, on-demand audio and visual enter-
tainment, and on most aircraft types, in-seat electricity socket.
Notably, both Emirates and Etihad installed 10-abreast seating in
their 777 aircraft, and Qatar Airways announced it would follow
suit. This meant that ME3 offered less room for each customer in
Economy compared with Singapore Airlines, which continued to
Table 5
Business return airfare regression analysis (SGD, 1 USDe1.3 SGD).
Variables and estimated coefﬁcients if signiﬁcant Model 1 Model 2
Itinerary-speciﬁc variables
Originates in Asia-Paciﬁc or Australasia (dummy) þ854*** e
Originates from airline's home country (dummy) 354y e
Requires ﬂight connection(s) (dummy) n.s. e
Total duration (hrs) less than fastest connection n.s. e
Total duration (hrs) more than fastest connection n.s. e
Guaranteed horizontally ﬂat bed in long haul (dummy) þ735* e
Airline-speciﬁc variables
Skytrax cabin-speciﬁc rating (number of stars) 556y e
Singapore Airlines dummy þ1453*** þ798***
Qantas dummy þ1377** þ1385**
Air France dummy þ895* n.s.
British Airways dummy þ890*** þ854***
Qatar Airways dummy þ526y 775***
Emirates dummy n.s. 467*
Etihad dummy n.s. 758***
Oman Air dummy n.s. 662*
Turkish dummy n.s. 626**
Other airlines offering airfares on these routes Included Included
Other dummy controls on dates, route-markets Included Included
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, yp < 0.10, n.s. ¼ not statistically signiﬁcant.
1103 observations involving 26 airlines; R2 ¼ 0.67 for Model 1, 0.62 for Model 2.
The fastest one-stop connecting itinerary in each market is used as the reference for each market to calculate whether an itinerary incurs
more or less time. Dummy variables: yes (1) or no (0). Airline dummies are relative to Cathay Paciﬁc.
Fig. 1. All-inclusive Business return fares for Sydney-London, SGD (1 USDe1.3 SGD).
Fig. 2. All-inclusive return Milan-Singapore fares in Business, SGD (1 USDe1.3 SGD).
Originating in Milan, Italy.
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Table 6
Comparing features of Economy cabins.
Emirates Etihad Qatar Airways Singapore Airlines
Economy cabin
Footrest available No Yes Depends Yes
In-seat electricity socket Yes Yes Yes Mostly
On-demand audio visual Yes Yes Yes Mostly
Amenity kit provided Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seat width ~1700 ~1700 18.2” (to 1700) ~1800
Skytrax star rating 3.5 4 5 4
Dependse depends on aircraft types. Mostlye onmost intercontinental services. Etihad and Qatar Airways' ratings were just prior to their selective withdrawal in 2014. Qatar
Airways has announced it would offer a similar conﬁguration in Economy on 777's as Emirates and Etihad.
Fig. 3. All-inclusive return Sydney-London fares in Economy, SGD (1 USDe1.3 SGD).
Fig. 4. All-inclusive return Singapore-London fares in Economy, SGD (1 USDe1.3 SGD). Originating in Singapore.
Fig. 5. All-inclusive return Milan-Singapore fares in Economy, SGD (1 USDe1.3 SGD). Originating in Milan, Italy.
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maintain a 9-abreast seating in their 777 aircraft (the difference in
one inch of seat width can be noticeable on a very long ﬂight).
Table 6 compares the features in Economy at ME3 and Singapore
Airlines.
If the wider seats in Economy compared with ME3's translated
into better comfort and therefore meaningful differentiation in the
eyes of customers, Singapore Airlines should be able to offer higher
prices than ME3. The survey that was conducted for Business air-
fares was also conducted for Economy, for the same markets and
itineraries.
Fig. 3 shows the average all-inclusive airfares for the Sydney-
London, U.K., market in Economy from Skyscanner.com, origi-
nating from Sydney and from London. In the Sydney-London
market, Singapore Airlines was somewhere in the middle in its
Economy prices among many other competitors. In fact, Singapore
Airlines' all-inclusive Economy return airfare was less than that of
Emirates for trips originating from both ends of the route.
Singapore Airlines' inability to price above Emirates in the Economy
cabin is itself a signiﬁcant sign of its weaker pricing power, espe-
cially in view of the former's wider seats.
Fig. 4 shows the average all-inclusive Economy return fares for
the Singapore-London market. Here, Singapore Airlines had both
the home market advantage and the highest non-stop frequencies
(four a day versus British Airways' two a day). Expectedly,
Singapore Airlines was able to price itself above most of its com-
petitors in this market. ME3 offered signiﬁcant discounts in this
market based on i) their connecting itinerary as well ii) Singapore
not being their sphere of inﬂuence. Still, the average airfare offered
by Singapore Airlines in this market was similar to a number of its
competitors, showing the intense competition it faced.
Fig. 5 shows the average all-inclusive Economy return fares for
the Milan-Singapore market. As mentioned earlier, Singapore Air-
lines was the only airline with a non-stop service in this market,
which should accord it a price premium. In reality, Singapore Air-
lines' airfare was not the highest in this market, and was only
marginally higher than that of Qatar e showing Singapore Airlines'
weak market presence and pricing power in Europe.
Table 7 shows the regression analysis of the Economy airfares
surveyed on the same markets and itineraries as reported earlier.
Model 3 included the different itinerary characteristics in the
analysis. Here, itineraries originating in Asia-Paciﬁc featured a price
premium of SGD $223. The Skytrax rating of the overall airline
cabin became statistically signiﬁcant, with each additional star
representing SGD $934 in return airfare. After considering other
effects including the Skytrax rating, Singapore Airlines' dummy
variable had a coefﬁcient of SGD -$290 with reference to Cathay
Paciﬁc's airfares e a discount relative to Emirates (SGD -$126), but
this was because Singapore Airlines enjoyed a higher Skytrax rat-
ing. Model 4 included only the airline, route and time dummy
variables in the analysis. Here, Singapore Airlines offered airfares
that were signiﬁcantly higher than those of Emirates, Etihad and
Qatar Airways (p < 0.001). In other words, Singapore Airlines took
on a more differentiated position relative to ME3. Fig. 6 shows the
relative positions of ME3 and Singapore Airlines in terms of market
scope and product characteristics.
3.3. Other strengths of Singapore Airlines
Given the intense competitive pressures as evident in the airfare
survey, it is important for Singapore Airlines to identify strengths
that would be difﬁcult for ME3 to copy. The airfare survey in fact
uncovered Singapore Airlines' strongmarketing power in its nearby
countries. Table 8 shows Singapore Airlines' average prices in four
markets where Singapore would have been a logical connection
point. The average return fares in Economy originating in South-
Table 7
Economy return airfares regression analysis.
Variables and estimated coefﬁcients if signiﬁcant Model 3 Model 4
Itinerary-speciﬁc variables
Originates in Asia-Paciﬁc or Australasia (dummy) þ223*** e
Originates from airline's home country (dummy) n.s. e
Requires ﬂight connection(s) (dummy) n.s. e
Total duration (hrs) less than fastest connection n.s. e
Total duration (hrs) more than fastest connection þ14y e
Airline-speciﬁc variables
Skytrax cabin-speciﬁc rating (number of stars) þ934*** e
Singapore Airlines dummy 290*** 124*
Air France dummy þ378*** 234**
British Airways dummy n.s. 286***
Emirates dummy 126y 443***
Oman Air dummy 263*** 328***
Qantas dummy 336* n.s.
Turkish dummy 397*** 441***
Etihad dummy 576*** 398***
Qatar Airways dummy 1582*** 466***
Other airlines offering airfares on these routes Included Included
Other dummy controls on dates, routes Included Included
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, yp < 0.10, n.s. ¼ not statistically signiﬁcant.
1172 observations involving 27 airlines; R2 ¼ 0.58 for Model 3, 0.51 for Model 4.
The fastest one-stop connecting itinerary in each market is used as the reference for
each market to calculate whether an itinerary incurs more or less time. Dummy
variables: yes (1) or no (0). Airline dummies are relative to Cathay Paciﬁc.
Fig. 6. Relative positions of ME3 and Singapore Airlines. Product characteristics.
Table 8
Singapore Airlines' average return fares for select routes (SGD, 1USDe1.3SGD).
Itinerary Economy Business Itinerary Economy Business
AMS-CGK-AMS 1091 5159 CGK-AMS-CGK 2059 9385
AMS-DPS-AMS 1300 5436 DPS-AMS-DPS 2001 7685
FRA-KUL-FRA 1860 6771 KUL-FRA-KUL 971 4343
PAR-CGK-PAR 1111 5244 CGK-PAR-CGK 2044 7512
Average 1341 5652 Average 1769 7231
AMS ¼ Amsterdam; CGK ¼ Jakarta; DPS ¼ Denpasar; FRA¼ Frankfurt; KUL¼ Kuala
Lumpur; PAR¼ Paris.
Table 9
Qatar Airways' average return fares for select routes (SGD, 1USDe1.3SGD).
Itinerary Economy Business Itinerary Economy Business
AMS-CGK-AMS 1108 3949 CGK-AMS-CGK 1950 6439
AMS-DPS-AMS 1120 5494 DPS-AMS-DPS 2101 5746
FRA-KUL-FRA 767 3180 KUL-FRA-KUL 801 4382
PAR-CGK-PAR 787 2627 CGK-PAR-CGK 1636 5492
Average 946 3813 Average 1622 5515
AMS ¼ Amsterdam; CGK ¼ Jakarta; DPS ¼ Denpasar; FRA¼ Frankfurt; KUL¼ Kuala
Lumpur; PAR¼ Paris.
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east Asia were 32% higher than those originating in Europe, while
those in Business originating in South-east Asia were 28% higher
than those originating in Europe. Higher prices for itineraries from
South-east Asia beneﬁted Singapore Airlines more than ME3 as
South-east Asia was well within the former's sphere of inﬂuence.
Table 9 shows that Qatar Airways' prices in the same markets were
generally not as high as Singapore Airlines'.
To leverage on this strength, Singapore Airlines can also further
emphasize the relative merits of ﬂying it to Europe versus ME3 for
customers in South-east Asia. Itineraries offered by ME3, by ne-
cessity of having to stop in the Middle East, mean that the other-
wise non-stop ﬂight of 12e14 h has to be split two 7- to 8-h sectors.
For a traveller wishing to sleep after an evening departure from
South-east Asia and arriving in Europe the next morning, the non-
stop long-haul sector allowedmore ﬂexibility on activities in-ﬂight,
and essentially a more restful ﬂight before a productive day ahead.
The same can be said of a late afternoon or evening departure from
Europe, after which travellers may want to maximize rest after a
meal on board. With the current structure of bilateral agreements
governing intercontinental air trafﬁc rights, it is highly unlikely that
ME3 would be accorded the rights to ﬂy non-stop between Europe
and South-east Asia. It was perhaps with this in mind that ME3 had
to offer more frills, especially in its premium cabins, to lure trav-
ellers away from the likes of Singapore Airlines. If this was indeed
the case, then the likes of Singapore Airlines need not respond like-
for-like in terms of frills offered vis-a-vis ME3.
Nevertheless, the same notion of a more restful ﬂight is not as
applicable for trips between Europe and Australasia. On this route,
travellers have to endure a long (12e14 h) ﬂight and a medium
(7e8 h) one whether a stop is made in the Middle East or in East
Asia. As a result, there is less unique value in Singapore Airlines'
offering.
4. Lessons from the perspective of generic strategy
4.1. Viable strategies
The analysis on the potential and actual market scope shows
that ME3 can beat Singapore Airlines hands-down. In fact, at least
one of the ME3 carriers, Emirates, already enjoys a signiﬁcant lead
in terms of market scope relative to Singapore Airlines, serving
many more destinations in Europe (over 30 compared with
Singapore Airlines' 13) and comparable number of destinations in
Asia and Australasia.
Going forward, Singapore Airlines and other carriers in a similar
position vis-a-vis ME3 would have a tough ﬁght meeting or
exceeding themarket scope reached or potentially reached byME3.
The latest generation of fuel-saving, small long-haul jets such as the
A350 and 787 could help airlinesmarginally reachmore small cities
outside of their traditional ‘sphere of inﬂuence’. Our airfare survey
shows that there is some evidence in offering non-stop ﬂights in
that doing so helps the operating carrier command higher prices in
Business class in speciﬁc markets. Combined with sufﬁcient de-
mand and skilful revenue management, the use of smaller aircraft
can increase proﬁtability (Fan, 2002). Airlines can understandably
use such smaller, long-haul jets to link smaller cities to their homes,
similar to how twin-engined aircraft became the norm in the trans-
Atlantic market (Oum and Taylor, 1995).
For Singapore Airlines, this means the potential to increase its
market scope in Europe with its own aircraft. For a smaller Euro-
pean city to sustain a new frequent direct ﬂight from Singapore
would itself be quite a feat, but even that may still pale with ME3's
offer of multiple daily ﬂights and hence more convenient sched-
ules. Alternatively, working with an alliance or code-share partner
could help bridge this gap, provided that a seamless experience
could be offered for the travellers.
Because of the difﬁculty for carriers like Singapore Airlines to
compete on market scope with ME3, it is imperative that they
compete on product characteristics. These airlines have to position
themselves as either more differentiated compared with ME3, or
have lower costs e and hence offer lower prices. Interestingly, ME3
offered more frills to its premium cabins (e.g., shower in First,
complimentary airport transfers, etc.) than most other competitors,
and yet at the same time packed their Economy cabins with the
most seats across the aircraft width.
Accordingly, competitors have to be adept in choosing a differ-
entiation or cost leadership position appropriate to a speciﬁc cabin.
Noting the wide gap between the industry-leading Business and
the cramped Economy products on ME3, at least two competitive
positions may be viable. First, competitors like Singapore Airlines
can offer a budget version of Business class, providing fewer frills
but services that are still signiﬁcantly better than standard Econ-
omy. Airlines with even less market scope and reputation than
Singapore Airlines may want to pursue this market position. Air-
lines content with older-style seats in their Business cabins may
also consider this market position.
Second, competitors can offer a more upscale version of Econ-
omy compared with ME3. Certainly, the pricing of these competi-
tive products would still have to make sense for the focal airline
concerned. Moreover, Premium Economy is also a good way to
recover some revenue lost from their Business cabins as a result of
more stringent corporate travel policies (Hugon-Duprat and
O'Connell, 2015).
4.2. What Singapore Airlines has done
By early 2016, Singapore Airlines had taken a few steps in line
with our analysis above, but more can and should be done. In terms
ofmarket scope, Singapore Airlines has over the years strengthened
its position in Australasia, increasing its weekly frequency to this
region by 40 as ME3 added 91 in the past ten years (Table 9).
Singapore Airlines recently announced that it would start ﬂying to a
new destination in Europe e Düsseldorf e from mid-2016 with its
new, fuel-saving long-haul jet A350. However, the proposed ser-
vice, at three times weekly, would still pale in comparison to
Emirates' existing twice daily service there. Singapore Airlines also
announced a new non-stop service to Canberra, Australia, and an
onward direct service toWellington, New Zealand. These routes can
help Singapore Airlines marginally increase its market scope on the
Europe-Australasia corridor. However, compared with ME3's
massive lead in Europe, it is unlikely that Singapore Airlines' new
service to Düsseldorf would pose a signiﬁcant threat to ME3's
Table 10
Increase in destinations and frequency to Europe and Australasia 2005e2015.
2005 Destinations served Total Weekly frequency Total
Europe Australasia Europe Australasia
Emirates 14 4 18 155 42 197
Etihad 5 0 5 34 0 34
Qatar 12 0 12 65 0 65
Singapore 9 7 16 69 106 170
2015 Destinations served Total Weekly frequency Total
Europe Australasia Europe Australasia
Emirates 35 7 42 438 84 522
Etihad 13 4 17 150 35 185
Qatar 25 2 27 270 14 284
Singapore 11 7 18 84 146 278
Source: Ofﬁcial Airline Guide, capacity by own aircraft
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presence there in the foreseeable future. The markets for Canberra
and Wellington are similarly small.
Knowing that it could not match ME3's market scope, Singapore
Airlines has also begun to work more closely with alliance partner
Lufthansa to better coordinate their prices and itineraries for the
ﬂights to/from Europe. For instance, more code-shared ﬂights be-
tween these two airlines can allow Singapore Airlines to sell the
same ticket to more small cities in Europe using Lufthansa-
operated intra-European ﬂights. This agreement has recently
expanded to include Swiss, a subsidiary of Lufthansa. These airlines
would have to ensure that travellers' experience on these ﬂights
ought to be as seamless as possible.
On product characteristics, Singapore Airlines has been wise to
ensure its products are adequately differentiated from those of
ME3's. In Business, its early adoption of the now state-of-the-art
horizontally ﬂat beds helped maintain a premium position in
relation to Emirates' and Qatar Airways' offering. Our airfare survey
showed that Singapore Airlines' Business Class commanded a
premium relative to ME3 and many other competitors. In Economy,
Singapore Airlines chose to maintain a more spacious seating
conﬁguration relative to ME3's on the 777's. At least for trips
originating in Asia, Singapore Airlines enjoyed a pricing premium
because of its high quality, but in general, the price premium was
smaller compared to the Business cabin.
Note that even though Singapore Airlines continued to maintain
a price premium relative toME3, its capacity increase over the years
severely lagged ME3's. Using information gleaned from published
airline schedules, Table 10 shows the extent of ME3's dramatic
expansion in both its destinations served and frequency of service
to/from Europe and Australasia in the past ten years, in relation to
Singapore Airlines'. To the latter's credit, however, Singapore Air-
lines has been able to increase its frequency to Australasia during
this period to strengthen its presence.
Fig. 7 juxtaposes the average fare premium for ME3 and
Singapore Airlines (average of Business and Economy airfares, as in
Models 2 and 4 earlier, relative to Cathay Paciﬁc) with their percent
increase in weekly frequency to Europe and Australasia from 2005
to 2015, with the percent increase in parentheses. It shows that
Singapore Airlines' price premium came at a cost of relatively
subdued growth in the face of ME3's.
In fact, one of the reasons why Singapore Airlines managed to
retain its cache of awards alongside the meteoric rise of ME3 was
that it sought to ‘constantly innovate its products in order to stay
ahead of the growing competition’, as explained by its Senior
Manager of Product Innovation (Huang, 2016). Notwithstanding
that Singapore Airlines introduced its latest First, Business and
Economy seats in 2013, the airline announced in early 2016 that it
would launch a new generation of Suites (its above-First cabin) and
Business products.
To further leverage on ME3's generally wide gap between their
Business and Economy cabins, Singapore Airlines started a new
Premium Economy cabin to entice its Economy customers to up-
grade themselves. The large price gap between products from the
Business and Economy (the former is about four times that of the
latter for Singapore Airlines) likely minimized the potential overlap
in prices in these cabins. Singapore Airlines offers one of the
poshest versions of Premium Economy cabins, with a small leg/foot
rest and access to some of the perks in Business such as noise-
reducing headsets and entrees bookable in advance.
4.3. Other responses to ME3
Other carriers based in South-east Asia responded similarly to
Singapore Airlines. In spite of losses, Thai Airways has expanded its
network in Europe, ﬂying non-stop to Oslo since 2009, and Brussels
since 2011. In recent years, however, losses have forced Thai to stop
serving Madrid and Moscow. Hong Kong-based Cathay Paciﬁc Air-
ways similarly launched non-stop service to Manchester, U.K., in
2014, followed by Düsseldorf and Zurich in 2015, and Madrid in
2016.
European carriers are arguably in an even stronger marketing
position in Europe compared with ME3, helping increase trafﬁc
feed to their ﬂights to Southeast-Asia and Australasia. The outgoing
Chief Executive of Air Francewas also quoted to say that the priority
for his successor would “be to keep developing long-haul opera-
tions” to Asia among other continents (Stothard, 2016). Air France
started its Paris-Kuala Lumpur service in 2013 (but stopped in
2015), and extended its daily Paris-Singapore ﬂights to Jakarta in
2014. After retreating for many years to just six cities in East Asia,
British Airways started a non-stop service to Seoul in 2012, fol-
lowed by Chengdu, China, in 2014 and Kuala Lumpur in 2015. Still,
the pace at which these new ﬂights have been added pales in
comparison with ME3's growth.
True to the saying “if you can't beat them, join them”, Qantas
Fig. 7. Average fare premium vs growth in frequency to Europe & Australasia. Average fare premium from our airfare survey. Source: Ofﬁcial Airline Guide.
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chose in 2013 to turn its former foe Emirates into a strategic alliance
partner after sustaining large losses in its European operations. It
reduced its European presence from a dozen cities in the 1980s to
just one in the same year, choosing instead to route its customers
through Dubai onto Emirates' ﬂights to these destinations. Mean-
while, it also closed its hub in Singapore and its long-standing daily
non-stop Singapore-Frankfurt service. Similarly, Malaysia Airlines
terminated its service to all other European cities except for London
in 2015, and chose to code-share with Emirates to these and other
cities in Europe.
In terms of product characteristics, airlines either have to
improve their Business seats to be able to convert into horizontally
ﬂat beds on a consistent basis, or risk losing a price premium. Many
other competitors to ME3, including Lufthansa, Cathay Paciﬁc,
Japan Airlines and All Nippon Airways and have also launched their
Premium Economy products in recent years. In Economy, airlines
seem to price their products according to objective service quality
(Skytrax rating).
For some carriers such as Singapore Airlines and Qantas, the
Premium Economy seats as of 2015 were in fact comparable to
those found in many Business cabins in the 1980's or earlier. There
exists signiﬁcant opportunity for ME3's competitors to consider
offering a slimmed-down version of Business seats offered at a
small premium to the Premium Economy cabins by Singapore
Airlines and Qantas.
Further, there is likely potential for ultra-low-cost carriers in the
Europe-Asia and Europe-Australasia corridor. Low-cost Norwegian
started several weekly non-stop ﬂights to Bangkok from Copen-
hagen, Oslo and Stockholm. However, the long travel duration in
these corridors would likely alter the economics of the regional
version of these carriers. Put simply, few travellers on the Europe-
Australasia corridor would plan for a just few days' stay at the
destination e as in the case for many low-cost carriers in the short-
haul market. It remains to be seen how quickly Norwegian would
ramp up its service to Asian.
5. Limitations and future research
Our analysis was conducted from the perspective of generic
strategy. We took as given the meteoric increase in capacity by
carriers based in the Middle East, and that this growth would un-
likely unwind itself. For example, Emirates already operated the
world's largest ﬂeet of about 60 A380 aeroplanese itself the largest
civilian aircraft for sale, and yet had another 80 on order (Critchlow,
2015). While large aircraft reduces unit costs (Fan, 2009; Lechner
and Gudmundsson, 2014), fast expanding airlines typically face a
drain on resources that increase their failure odds (Fan et al., 2014).
We did not explore whether ME3's expansion was a result of
favourable government policies that would not exist in many other
countries (Critchlow, 2015; M.R., 2015). We also did not explore
whether the home countries of airlines threatened by ME3's
meteoric rise would be able to amend the trafﬁc rights granted to
these three carriers, or whether the rise of intra-Asia liberalization
in trafﬁc rights would changeME3's advantages (e.g., Fu et al., 2010;
Forsyth et al., 2006). Future research could perhaps shedmore light
on these issues.
While we were able to articulate gaps in competitors' strategy,
we were not able to examine whether certain strategy in fact
resulted in higher revenues over others because we could not ac-
cess passenger volume data. Researchers with access to such data
can better analyse the quantitative trade-offs among these strate-
gies. Our airfare survey also did not focus on the dispersion of air-
fares offered by ME3 and their competitors (Mantin and Koo, 2009;
Obermeyer et al., 2013), but rather the lowest available in Business
or Economy for a reasonably convenient itinerary at the point of our
sampling. Future research can help unpack any signiﬁcant differ-
ences in the dispersion of fares offered by these airlines. In fact, we
did include more service attributes in our regression, such as on-
demand dining and complimentary chauffeur rides, but since
these were offered by exceedingly few airlines, we could not
simultaneously estimate the coefﬁcients for these variables as well
as those of the associated airline dummy variables. If more airlines
offer these service in the future, researchers would then be able to
simultaneously include these in the same regression as the asso-
ciated airline dummy variables.
In parallel, ME3 themselves have been active in ﬁnding ways to
increase their reach. While Emirates had preferred organic growth,
its strategic alliance with Qantas gave it much a vaunted presence
in Asia and Australasia. Qatar Airways joined Oneworld alliance at
the end of 2013. Etihad Airways bought minority stakes into a host
of airlines including Air Serbia, Air Seychelles, Alitalia and Jet Air-
ways of India. There is yet no study that analyses which of these
modes of growth would be most proﬁtable.
Moreover, while this paper focuses mostly on the three leading
Middle East carriers (Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways), Oman
Air is at this writing beginning to spread its wings to connect
Europewith Asia-Paciﬁc. Turkish Airlines, technically based outside
of the Middle East, has signiﬁcantly expanded in the past decade to
position its Istanbul home base as a hub connecting Europe with
Asia-Paciﬁc (Dursun et al., 2014). While we included dummy vari-
ables for Turkish Airlines and Oman Air in the fare survey and
regression, we did not embed them more deeply in this paper
because neither served Australasia with their own aircraft. Future
studies can include these two airlines in analysing strategic options
in the Europe-Asia corridor.
Further, our focus in this paper is on the Europe-South-east Asia
and Europe-Australasia corridors e where the competition be-
tween ME3 and traditional full-service carriers in these markets
has been most intense. A sizable part of Singapore Airlines' route
network, namely intra-Asia routes, is still immune to the growth of
ME3. There, Singapore Airlines still enjoys considerable pricing
power against its competitors.
Lastly, because of lack of information, we did not address the
extent to which ME3 or their competitors are effective in managing
their costs. We took as an implicit assumption that the use of fuel-
efﬁcient aircraft and state-of-the-art crew scheduling tools allowed
major airlines to properly manage their costs. Certainly, speciﬁc
airlines, such as Air France-KLM (Stothard, 2016), have reported
issues with their unions in adjusting their work rules. These issues
could exacerbate the difﬁcult positions these airlines might have
vis-a-vis theME3. Future research can perhaps examine the issue of
cost competitiveness as well.
6. Conclusions
Several Middle East carriers now offer multiple daily connec-
tions between dozens of cities in Europe and Asia-Paciﬁc, with a
signiﬁcant presence in Australasia, Africa as well as an increasing
presence in both North and South America. They posed signiﬁcant
competition to many full-service carriers based in Europe, Asia and
Australasia. In general, it is difﬁcult for these competitors to
compete with ME3 based on extensive market scope, even though
the latest small, long-haul aircraft could help these competitors
marginally extend their market scope. Logically, they should focus
on carving out different niches in their products. In the Business
cabin, guaranteeing horizontally ﬂat beds in Business is now amust
for airlines to achieve a signiﬁcant price premium. In Economy,
improving the overall service quality helps command higher prices.
Singapore Airlines and other carriers in a similar position vis-a-vis
the Middle East carriers have embarked on these strategies to some
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extent, but more still ought to be done.
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